Finite-key-size security of the Phoenix-Barnett-Chefles 2000 quantum-key-distribution protocol

Mhlambululi Mafu; Kevin Garapo; Francesco Petruccione

doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.90.032308

Finite-key-size security of the Phoenix-Barnett-Chefles 2000 quantum-key-distribution protocol

Mhlambululi Mafu
, Kevin Garapo
, Francesco Petruccione

Physics & Astronomy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The postselection technique was introduced by Christandl, König, and Renner [Phys. Rev. Lett. 102, 020504 (2009)PRLTAO0031-900710.1103/PhysRevLett.102.020504] in order to simplify the security of quantum-key-distribution schemes. Here, we present how it can be applied to study the security of the Phoenix-Barnett-Chefles 2000 trine-state protocol, a symmetric version of the Bennett 1992 protocol.

Original language	English
Article number	032308
Journal	Physical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
Volume	90
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.90.032308
Publication status	Published - Sept 8 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics

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10.1103/PhysRevA.90.032308

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Finite-key-size security of the Phoenix-Barnett-Chefles 2000 quantum-key-distribution protocol

Abstract

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